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A fast time simulation was conducted to test the detect and avoid Well Clear deﬁnition
designed for en route use when an unmanned aircraft (UA) is approaching the landing pattern
of the terminal area. Measures focused on were loss of well clear and alerts intended to help the
pilot avoid loss of well clear. Data indicated warning-level alerts will occur outside the typical
Class D airspace which may prevent the UA from normal operations in the terminal airspace.
Other aircraft on 45o entry could result in “nuisance” alerts which may also prevent the UA
from normal operations in the terminal airspace. However, eliminating horizontal proximity
(τmod) has the potential to increase “nuisance” alerts on the 45o entry and downwind legs.
Overall, this suggests that a more stringent deﬁnition of Well Clear may be advisable in the
landing pattern of the terminal area.
I. Nomenclature
dh = vertical separation
DMOD = distance modiﬁcation
HMD = horizontal miss distance (horizontal separation)
τmod = temporal separation
AGL = above ground level
CPA = closest point of approach
DAA = detect and avoid
DWC = DAA well clear
ft = feet
KTAS = knots true airspeed
kts = knots
LoWC = loss of well clear
min = minute
MOPS = minimum operational performance standards
nmi = nautical mile(s)
sec or s = second(s)
UA = unmanned aircraft
UAS = unmanned aerial system
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II. Introduction
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Unmanned Aerial Systems Integration in the NationalAirspace System (UAS Integration in the NAS) project is developing detect and avoid (DAA) system performance
capabilities and enumerating limitations so that UAS can integrate seamlessly and safely into the current NAS. Work to
date has deﬁned DAA well clear (DWC) parameters for UAS operations in the en route environment [1]. These DWC
parameters incorporate a horizontal distance and temporal threshold, and vertical distance threshold [2]. From this,
RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) developed minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for DAA to
replace see and avoid [1, 3].
These MOPS are only applicable for UA transitioning from terminal airspace to higher altitudes where other means
of separation are provided [1]. The eﬀectiveness of en route DWC parameters for a UAS in the terminal area traﬃc
pattern has not been veriﬁed and excessive alerts may occur [4]. The terminal area often requires vehicles to be separated
by smaller distances than en route, and these typically smaller distances may unnecessarily result in loss of DAA well
clear (LoWC) and inadvertent alerts for aircraft behaving appropriately. The research described in this paper begins to
detail the eﬀects of using the en route DWC deﬁnition in the terminal area. This initial study used fast-time simulation
techniques to detail DWC violations between a UAS and intruder aircraft in the standard visual traﬃc pattern using the
en route DWC parameter deﬁnitions.
III. Background
Chapter 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Section 91.113 requires that “vigilance shall be maintained
by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft” and maintain well clear from other aircraft [5].
The deﬁnition of well clear was left intentionally vague to allow the pilot in command to determine the appropriate safe
separation in any given encounter. Without a pilot on board the aircraft, UAS must compensate by using a DAA system
to maintain safe separation. SC-228 has deﬁned a quantitative separation standard for UAS in the en route operational
environment, termed DAA well clear or DWC. Using an array of on-board sensors, alerting and guidance algorithms,
and a ground control station, the DAA system provides suﬃcient information for a remote pilot to safely operate the
unmanned aircraft (UA).
DWC is a volume maintained around the UA that incorporates vertical and horizontal distance as well as a time
component (Fig. 1a) [1, 6]. A DWC violation is deﬁned as
[
0 ≤ τmod ≤ τ∗mod ‖rxy ≤ DMOD
]
and [HMD ≤ HMD∗] and [−h∗ ≤ dh ≤ h∗] (1)
where τ∗
mod
= 35 sec  horizontal proximity, rxy  horizontal range, DMOD = HMD∗  distance modiﬁcation,
HMD∗ = 4000 ft  horizontal miss distance, h∗ = 450 ft  vertical separation, and τmod , HMD and dh are described
in Appendix A on page 9.
In addition to the DWC deﬁnition, this fast-time simulation also incorporated en route alerting requirements,
speciﬁed by DO-365 [1], in the terminal area. For each level of alert, there are associated Hazard Zones and Non-Hazard
(a) DAA Well Clear Volume with En Route Parameter Values (b) DAA Well Clear Hazard Regions
Fig. 1 Well Clear Volume and Alerting Zones
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Zones deﬁned to provide ﬂexibility in the implementation of an alerting system (Fig. 1b on the preceding page). These
zones deﬁne where an alert must be issued and where an alert is undesirable, respectively. Alerts are issued by the
reference DAA algorithm, DAIDALUS [7], and evaluated against the Hazard/Non-Hazard zones. There were also two
alerting thresholds, early and late, which are measured relative to the time the hazard zone is violated. Hazard zone
volume and hazard zone alert times are shown in Table 1 [6].
Table 1 DAA Alerting Requirements
Alert Type Preventive Corrective WarningAlert Alert Alert
Hazard Zone
τ∗
mod
(sec) 35 35 35
DMOD and HMD∗ (nmi) 0.66 0.66 0.66
h∗ (ft) 700 450 450
Hazard Zone
Minimum Average 55 55 25Time of Alert (sec)
Alert Times Late Threshold (sec) 20 20 15
Early Threshold (sec) 75 75 55
There are three alert levels: Preventive, Corrective, and Warning. The preventive is a caution-level alert [8]
intended to bring awareness to the pilot of traﬃc that may become a danger if either the UA or intruder maneuvers
vertically. Corrective alerts are caution-level alerts, designed to have the UA pilot recognize traﬃc, determine an
appropriate maneuver, and begin to coordinate with Air Traﬃc Control (ATC) prior to maneuvering. The warning alert,
a warning-level alert [8], is designed for the UA pilot to promptly recognize traﬃc, determine an appropriate maneuver,
and execute the maneuver to maintain DWC. Since preventive alerts do not occur in all encounter geometries (e.g.,
co-altitude encounters), only corrective and warning alerts are discussed herein.
IV. Experiment Description
A. Objectives
The speciﬁc objectives accomplished in this fast-time simulation were (1) exploring eﬀects of alerting performance
of the en route DWC deﬁnition and associated alerting criteria in Class D/E terminal airspace, in particular, in the
landing pattern; and (2) evaluating the en route DWC deﬁnition in the terminal area with an assumption of having
perfect surveillance of intruder aircraft.
B. Fast-Time Simulation Environment
Fig. 2 Straight Legs and Turns in Visual Landing Pat-
tern with UAS on Straight-In Instrument Approach
The fast-time simulation entailed the UA on an instru-
ment approach to an airport with a 3o glideslope approach
with an intruder aircraft in a standard visual approach
pattern for landing on the same runway. The simulation
was open loop and without a sensor model; therefore,
vehicle maneuverability was not considered and no mit-
igation for sensor uncertainty was needed [9]. UA and
intruder aircraft performance characteristics are detailed
in Table 2 on the following page. While the UA was
always on ﬁnal approach, the intruder was on one of the
legs of a standard visual approach pattern or turning onto
one of these legs. The intruder legs were midﬁeld entry,
45o entry, downwind, and base. The turns were turn to downwind, turn to base, and turn to ﬁnal. See Fig. 2 and Table 3
on the following page for a description of the legs and turns. Each run consisted of a combination of the UA on ﬁnal
approach and the intruder aircraft on any one of the legs or turning onto a leg.
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Table 2 UA and Intruder Aircraft Characteristics
Parameter Value(s)
UA
Airspeed (kts) 40, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 200
Climb Rate (ft/min) ±500 and ±1000
Flight Path Angle 3o
Minimum Approach Altitude (ft) 200
Intruder
Airspeed (kts) 60, 75, 90, 120, 150, 180, 200
Pattern Altitude (ft AGL) 1000 and 1500
Climb Rate (ft/min) ±500 and ±1000
Table 3 Legs and Turns Description
Leg or Turn Description
Straight 45o Entry 45 degree entry into pattern
Leg Midﬁeld Entry aircraft ﬂies over the runway at an altitude <1000 ft and descends to join downwind leg
of pattern
Downwind long level ﬂight path parallel to but in the opposite direction of landing runway
Extended Downwind see Downwind
Base short descending ﬂight path at right angles to the approach end extended centerline of
landing runway
Final descending ﬂight path in direction of landing along extended runway centerline from
base leg to runway
Turns Turn to Downwind turn onto Downwind leg
Turn to Base turn onto Base leg
Turn to Final turn onto Final leg
V. Data Analysis
Data was analyzed using IBM® SPSS® Statistics Version 24∗, SAS/JMP® Version 13, and Mathwork® MATLAB®
Version R2017a software. Note that data were ﬁltered to eliminate any runs that began in LoWC or runs that never
resulted in a LoWC.
Certain key events occurred in each run. At each event, a common set of metrics was gathered. These events
included closest point of approach (CPA), LoWC, near midair collision (NMAC) [10], early and late alert thresholds,
and when DAIDALUS alerts were issued.
LoWC occurred when Eq. 1 on page 2 was true with τ∗
mod
, HMD∗, and h∗ values indicated in Table 1 on the
preceding page. Early and late alert thresholds are also indicated in Table 1 on the previous page. CPA is the minimum
three dimensional range between the two aircraft at any time throughout the encounter.
A. Loss of Well Clear Geometry
LoWC was calculated for all segment encounters, and the most problematic were those with intruder aircraft on 45o
entry, downwind, and base. Figure 3 on the following page provides a graphical representation of the key events in the
vicinity of the airport environment. In each ﬁgure, the runway is displayed at the origin (0,0) and is shown with a 5000
ft runway length. There is a solid black line indicating the UA’s constant trajectory. For simplicity, the ﬁgure only shows
the positions for straight traﬃc pattern segments, each indicated by a unique color. As can be seen in Fig. 3 on the next
page, a LoWC could occur with the UA as far out as 4.5 nmi from the runway threshold.
The horizontal distance between the UA and the intruder aircraft at initial LoWC could be as great at 2 nmi for
intruder aircraft on 45o entry (Fig. 4 on the following page). This could result in “nuisance” alerts before the LoWC as
described in [11]. These “nuisance” alerts may unnecessarily cause the UA to perform a missed approach even though
the intruder aircraft is entering the traﬃc pattern and is not a threat to the UA. Intruder aircraft on downwind near base
∗The use of trademarks or names of manufacturers in this report is for accurate reporting and does not constitute an oﬃcial endorsement, either
expressed or implied, of such products or manufacturers by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
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Fig. 3 LoWC Geometry
and on base may be only 0.5 nmi from the UA when there is a LoWC. In
these cases, alerting may be appropriate since the intruder aircraft is close
to turning on ﬁnal where the UA is on glideslope, which is recommended
in [11].
B. Alerts
1. Alert Geometry by Intruder Leg
A primary concern when applying the en route DWC deﬁnition when
interacting with the visual traﬃc pattern is the range at which the UA would
receive alerts which would cause a disruption to the UA’s intended operation.
To identify the relative proximity to the airport at which alerts and LoWC
occur, a series of ﬁgures presenting the intruder and UA position at key
events were developed. Figure 5 on the next page shows aircraft position
for each of the speciﬁed events. The colored dots in each ﬁgure represents
the position of the ownship and intruder aircraft when each event occurred.
Note that the UA position is always in line with 0 feet East-West (x-axis).
In Fig. 5a and 5b on the following page, the UA may receive Corrective
alerts as far out as 8.55 nmi from the runway. Similarly, a Corrective alert
may be issued on an intruder aircraft on an extended base more than 4
nmi from the runway centerline. These dimensions are larger than the
Class D airspace surrounding an airport environment (typically a 4.4 nmi
radius). The Late Corrective alert threshold indicates the positions at which
a Corrective alert must be issued. Figure 5b on the next page shows that
the Late Corrective alert threshold may be crossed when the UA is nearly 5
nmi from the runway while the UA would still typically be outside of Class
D airspace dimensions.
Potentially more imperative within the terminal area, the issuance of the Warning alert is bound between the Early
Warning position and the Late Warning position, as shown in Figs.5c and 5d on the following page respectively. From
the ﬁgure, Warning level alerts may be issued between up to 7.45 nmi and 5.25 nmi; of which both bounds are outside
of the Class D airspace. Therefore, warning-level alerts at this distance may prevent the UA from normal operations
Fig. 4 Horizontal Distance between UA and Intruder Aircraft at Initial LoWC
5
(a) Early Corrective (b) Late Corrective (c) Early Warning (d) Late Warning
Fig. 5 UA and Intruder Aircraft Position at Alert Event
in the terminal airspace because the DAA system would be constantly recommending path deviations due to aircraft
established in the nominal terminal area traﬃc pattern, which would most likely result in the UA performing a missed
approach.
Figure 6 on the next page shows box plots for the UA distance to the runway at each event separated by intruder
aircraft traﬃc pattern segment. This ﬁgure gives a better sense of where the UA is positioned when each event occurred,
and contains a unique box plot for each combination of event and intruder traﬃc pattern segment. From the ﬁgure,
downwind and extended downwind segments resulted in the greatest UA range to runway for each event. As a supplement
to Fig. 6 on the following page, Table 4 captures the maximum UA distance to runway for each event and traﬃc pattern
segment.
Table 4 UA Range to Runway
Intruder Leg
Maximum UA Distance to Runway (nmi)
Early Late Early Late LoWC
Corrective Corrective Warning Warning
45o Entry 7.53 3.91 6.43 3.63 2.12
Base Entry 7.50 4.47 6.40 4.19 3.37
Base 7.65 4.65 6.56 4.37 3.55
Downwind 8.55 5.53 7.45 5.25 4.42
Midﬁeld Entry 5.84 2.81 4.74 2.53 1.71
As seen in the Fig. 6 on the following page and Table 4, the downwind segments result in the UA being furthest away
from the runway when each event occurred. Many downwind legs are ﬂown within 4000 ft of the runway centerline for
many general aviation piston aircraft. These aircraft on downwind are commonly in violation of the HMD component
of DWC accounting for the large UA distance to runway.
2. Inﬂuence of UA Airspeed on Alerts
Focusing on the downwind segment as the encounter that resulted in the furthest UA range to the threshold at each
event, Fig. 7 on the following page shows the inﬂuence of UA airspeed for each event. The ﬁgure shows the maximum
UA range to the runway threshold in nmi at each event as a function of the UA airspeed. The maximum distance to the
runway at an alert event is shown in Table 4 and these maximum distances occurred with the UA ﬂying at 200 KTAS,
which is the maximum speed allowed in the terminal airspace [12].
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Fig. 6 UA Range to Runway at Alert Event
Within the operational speed range enabled by DO-365 [1], to avoid LoWC outside of 4 nmi with aircraft in the
immediate airport traﬃc pattern, UA operations must be limited to 150 KTAS. However, Corrective and Warning alerts
Fig. 7 UA Range to Runway for Downwind Segment as
a Function of Airspeed and Event
may occur between 5 nmi to 7.5 nmi from the runway
(outside the typical Class D airspace) when the UA speed
is 150 KTAS.
C. First and Last Well Clear Parameter Violated
The ﬁrst and last DWC parameter (τ∗
mod
, HMD∗, and
h∗) to be violated was found (Fig. 8 on the following
page). As can be seen in Fig. 8a on the next page, dh,
vertical separation, was typically the ﬁrst DWC parameter
to be exceeded when the intruder was near the runway
threshold (i.e., departures, turn to base, and base) and
for turn to downwind. The compressed altitude ranges,
especially near the runway threshold, between aircraft
in the visual landing pattern most likely account for
this. Horizontal miss distance, HMD, was the ﬁrst DWC
parameter violated for the entries (i.e., 45o, midﬁeld, and
base entries). In these cases, the intruding aircraft is
descending to enter the traﬃc pattern while still fairly
high relative to the UA but the lateral distance between the
vehicles is decreasing, especially for high closure rates.
The last DWC parameter exceeded was typically τmod, horizontal proximity, for the straight legs and HMD,
horizontal miss distance, for turn to downwind and base (Fig. 8b on the following page). The close proximity of aircraft
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(a) First Well Clear Parameter Violated (b) Last Well Clear Parameter Violated
Fig. 8 Well Clear Parameter Violation by Leg
in a visual traﬃc pattern, as compared to en route, accounts for the time variable of DWC, τmod, being the last to be
exceeded for the straight legs. For turns, the horizontal component of DWC, HMD, was ﬁnally exceeded because
the time component, τmod , most likely was exceeded once the intruder’s straight track projection intersected the UA’s
glideslope, which was early in the turn initiation.
In general, the farther away the intruder was to runway threshold, the larger the diﬀerences in time between the ﬁrst
and last DWC parameter violated (Fig. 9 on the next page). With the consideration of where alerting may become a
“nuisance” and where it may be appropriate [11], eliminating τmod has the potential to increase “nuisance” alerts on the
45o entry and downwind legs.
VI. Conclusion
A fast-time simulation was conducted to test the eﬀects of the en route DWC deﬁnition in the terminal area for a
UA on ﬁnal approach and an intruder aircraft in the visual landing or taking oﬀ ﬂight pattern. The measures focused
on were Corrective and Warning alert thresholds, LoWC, and the associated geometries between the UA and intruder
aircraft when these events occurred.
The geometry of the UA and intruder aircraft to the runway indicates that the Early Corrective alert threshold may
be crossed while the UA is 8.55 nmi from the runway and Warning level alerts may be issued as far away as 7.5 nmi
from the runway. Furthermore, to avoid LoWC outside of 4 nmi with aircraft in the immediate airport traﬃc pattern,
UA operations must be limited to 150 KTAS. However, Corrective and Warning alerts may still occur between 5 nmi
to 7.5 nmi from the runway at this UA speed, which are outside the typical Class D airspace. Warning-level alerts at
this distance may prevent the UA from normal operations in the terminal airspace because the DAA system would be
constantly recommending path deviations due to aircraft established in the nominal terminal area traﬃc pattern.
LoWC was calculated for all segment encounters and the most problematic were those intruder aircraft on 45o entry,
downwind, and base. For intruder aircraft on 45o entry, the horizontal distance between the UA and intruder aircraft at
initial LoWC could be as great as 2 nmi. These LoWC could result in “nuisance” alerts, which may unnecessarily cause
the UA to perform a missed approach even though the intruder aircraft is entering the traﬃc pattern and is not a threat to
the UA. However, intruder aircraft close to turning ﬁnal may be only 0.5 nmi from the UA when there is a LoWC. In
these cases, alerting may be appropriate since the intruder aircraft is closer to the UA which is on ﬁnal.
Horizontal proximity, τmod , was typically the last DWC parameter violated for the straight legs and HMD, horizontal
miss distance, for turns. With the consideration of where alerting may become a “nuisance” and where it may be
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Fig. 9 Well Clear Parameter Violation Time Diﬀerence
appropriate [11], eliminating τmod has the potential to increase “nuisance” alerts on the 45o entry and downwind legs.
Therefore, using the en route DWC deﬁnition in the terminal area will incur many LoWC due to the compressed
lateral and vertical ranges of aircraft in the landing traﬃc pattern. These compressed ranges are valid in the terminal
area; thus, the UAS pilot may unnecessarily react to essentially “nuisance” alerts that would necessitate the UA operator
to determine whether an avoidance maneuver is required [13, 14]. These results suggest that a more stringent deﬁnition
of DAA Well Clear may be advisable in the terminal area [11, 15], which will hopefully decrease “nuisance” alerts
while maintaining a safe distance from appropriately behaving traﬃc in the terminal area ﬂight pattern.
Appendix A
For computing LoWC, equations for τmod , HMD, and dh are
τmod =
DMOD2 − r2
r r
 Modiﬁed Tau [time]
where DMOD ≈ HMD∗
r = xy-range between vehicles
r = xy-range rate between vehicles
HMD =
√
(dx + vxtCPA)2 +
(
dy + vytCPA
)2
where HMD = Horizontal Miss Distance
d[x,y] = distance in the [x, y] direction
v[x,y] = velocity in the [x, y] direction
tCPA = time at closest point of approach
9
and
dh = abs
(
hAC2 − hAC1
)
where h = height
AC = aircraft.
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